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THE EXPANSION OF LONG-ARM
JURISDICTION IN TEXAS: HALL V.
HELICOPTEROS NA CIONALES DE
COLOMBIA, S.A.
IN 1974 Petro Peru, the state-owned Peruvian oil company, contracted
with Williams-Sedco-Horn, a joint venture,' to build a pipeline from
its drilling site in the Amazon jungles of Peru to the Pacific Ocean.
Consequently, Williams-Sedco-Horn contracted with Helicopteros Na-
cionales de Colombia, S.A. (Helicol) 2 to transport workers and supplies by
helicopter to the jungle interior. Four workers, hired in Houston by Wil-
liams-Sedco-Horn, were killed when a Helicol helicopter crashed in Peru
while transporting the workers. Neither the workers nor their survivors
were residents of Texas, but each was a United States citizen. The survi-
vors brought separate actions in Harris County, Texas, and service of pro-
cess was had on Helicol under article 2031b, the Texas long-arm
jurisdiction statute.3 Helicol entered a special appearance in each case to
1. The joint venture consisted of Williams International Sudamericana, Ltd., a Dela-
ware corporation with headquarters in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and two Texas corporations, Sedco
Construction Corp. and Horn International, Inc. The joint venture was organized for the
sole purpose of performing the contract in Peru.
2. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., referred to by the Texas Supreme
Court as "Helicol," is a Colombia corporation with its principal place of business in Bogota,
Colombia. Ninety-four percent of its stock is owned by Avianca, the national airline of
Colombia.
3. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 203 1b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982-1983) provides:
Sec. 3. Any foreign corporation, association, joint stock company, partner-
ship, or non-resident natural person that engages in business in this State, irre-
spective of any Statute or law respecting designation or maintenance of
resident agents, and does not maintain a place of regular business in this State
or a designated agent upon whom service may be made upon causes of action
arising out of such business done in this State, the act or acts of engaging in
such business within this State shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment
by such foreign corporation, joint stock company, association, partnership, or
non-resident natural person of the Secretary of State of Texas as agent upon
whom service of process may be made in any action, suit or proceedings aris-
ing out of such business done in this State, wherein such corporation, joint
stock company, association, partnership, or non-resident natural person is a
party or is to be made a party.
Sec. 4. For the purpose of this Act, and without including other acts that
may constitute doing business, any foreign corporation, joint stock company,
association, partnership, or non-resident natural person shall be deemed doing
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contest jurisdiction.4 The trial court overruled each special appearance.5
The cases were consolidated for trial, resulting in a jury verdict against
Helicol and a joint judgment of $1,141,200 for the plaintiffs.6 The Hous-
ton [1st District] court of appeals reversed and ordered the case dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. 7 The Texas Supreme Court granted writ of error.8
Finding insufficient contacts between Helicol and Texas to warrant asser-
tion of jurisdiction, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
court of civil appeals.9 On motion for rehearing, the court in a plurality
opinion withdrew its original opinion and reversed the court of appeals.
Held, reversed: The defendant, through its activities in Texas, had suffi-
cient minimum contacts with the state to justify a finding of jurisdiction
without offending due process, even though the cause of action did not
arise out of the defendant's activities. Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A., 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982).
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION, DUE PROCESS, AND LONG-ARM STATUTES
The United States Constitution established a federal system of govern-
ment under which the states retain certain essential attributes of sover-
eignty, including the power to try causes in their courts.' 0 The sovereignty
retained by each state necessarily implies a limitation on the sovereignty of
business in this State by entering into contract by mail or otherwise with a
resident of Texas to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this
State, or the committing of any tort in whole or in part in this State. The act
of recruiting Texas residents, directly or through an intermediary located in
Texas, for employment inside or outside of Texas shall be deemed doing busi-
ness in this State.
Prior to the enactment of art. 203 Ib, Texas had no general jurisdictional statute. Thode, In
Personam Jurisdiction, Article 2031b, The Texas "'Long Arm" Jurisdiction Statute; And the
Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEX. L. REv. 279, 304 n. 165
(1964). See generally Wilson, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents: An Invitation
anda Proposal, 9 BAYLOR L. REv. 363, 372-79 (1957).
4. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a. Rule 120a provides for appellate review from the grant-
ing of a motion to quash service and dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Because no interloc-
utory appeal is available from the overruling of such a motion, Helicol could not obtain
immediate appellate review after denial of its jurisdictional challenge.
5. 616 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1981).
6. Id
7. In determining whether Helicol was subject to the jurisdiction of Texas courts, the
appellate court applied the three-pronged O'Brien test, infra notes 45-46 and accompanying
text, which had been approved by the Texas Supreme Court in U-Anchor Advertising, Inc.
v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1977). 616 S.W.2d at 251.
The appellate court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to show sufficient contacts be-
tween Helicol and Texas to justify assertion ofjurisdiction under the Texas long-arm statute.
Id at 252.
8. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 390 (May 13, 1981).
9. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 190 (Feb. 24, 1982).
10. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980). In this case
plaintiffs brought a products liability action in an Oklahoma state court against a New York
retailer and wholesaler for injuries suffered in an accident that occurred while the plaintiffs
were driving through Oklahoma. The state courts denied defendants' jurisdictional chal-
lenge, but the United States Supreme Court reversed, finding a total absence of affiliating
circumstances between defendants and the forum. Id at 295.
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the other states." A state court's power to render a binding personal judg-
ment against a nonresident defendant is limited by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.' 2 In general, "[d]ue process requires that
the defendant be given adequate notice of suit' 3 . . . and be subject to the
personal jurisdiction of the court."14
The United States Supreme Court established the foundation for mod-
ern jurisdictional requirements in International Shoe Co. v. Washington. 5
In International Shoe the Court held that a state court can only exercise
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who has sufficient "minimum
contacts" with the forum state "such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' ",16 Ac-
cording to the Court, once a nonresident engages in activities within a
state, he incurs an obligation to defend suits which "arise out of or are
connected with" those activities.17 The Court also noted, however, that
instances exist in which "continuous" and "substantial" operations within
a state are sufficient to justify suit against the nonresident defendant in
causes of action "entirely distinct from those activities.",8 The Supreme
Court made clear in Hanson v. Denckla, 19 however, that in each case the
defendant must do some act by which it "purposefully avails itself' of the
benefits and protections of the forum state's laws.20 Similarly, in Kulko v.
Superior Court,2 1 the Supreme Court stated that the defendant must do
11. Id at 293.
12. Id. at 291; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, which provides: "[Nior shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
13. 444 U.S. at 291 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14
(1950)).
14. 444 U.S. at 291 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945)).
15. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). State courts held the defendant corporation subject to state
unemployment compensation fund fees and amenable to suit in state court to recover for
same. The Supreme Court affirmed because of the systematic and continuous activities car-
ried on by the defendant in the state. Id at 320-22.
16. Id at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). The concept of
minimum contacts serves the dual purpose of protecting a defendant from the burdens of
litigating in a distant forum and also ensures that the states do not overreach the territorial
limits implicit in the federal system. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
291-92 (1980).
17. 326 U.S. at 319.
18. Id at 318; see Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). In
Perkins the Supreme Court concluded that Ohio could exercise jurisdiction over a Philip-
pine corporation that had temporarily relocated its business offices to Ohio during World
War II. Because of defendant's continuous and systematic activities in the state, due process
did not require that the suit arise from the specific activities. Id. at 446.
19. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). The Supreme Court held that the Florida courts did not have
in rem jurisdiction over the corpus of a trust located in Delaware, or personal jurisdiction
over a Delaware trust company, and could not, therefore, pass on the validity of the trust.
Id at 250-52.
20. Id at 253.
21. 436 U.S. 84 (1978). Defendant, a New York resident, unsuccessfully challenged the
jurisdiction of California courts over him in an action for increased child support. The
United States Supreme Court reversed, finding insufficient contacts to warrant assertion of
jurisdiction. Id at 94. The Court found that defendant's acquiescence to his daughter's
wish to live in California did not constitute "availment" of the benefits of California law.
Id
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some act for which he "could reasonably have anticipated being 'haled
before a [California] court.' "22 These due process limitations provide a
degree of predictability to the legal system and therefore allow potential
defendants to structure their conduct in a way that will avoid inconvenient
litigation in distant forums. 23
Significantly, the Court in Kulko stressed that the relevant factors to be
weighed in determining the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction in-
clude not only the burden that will be imposed on the nonresident in re-
quiring him to defend in the forum, but also the forum state's interest in
adjudicating the dispute.24 In an earlier decision, McGee v. International
Life Insurance Co. ,25 the Supreme Court had found such a state interest
manifested by a special long-arm jurisdictional statute that dealt specifi-
cally with insurance contracts between residents and foreign corpora-
tions.26 Long-arm statutes are state enactments that provide for personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents through substituted service of process. 27 A
state may not exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident pursuant to a long-
arm statute beyond the limits established by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 28
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 2031b IN THE COURTS
Article 203 Ib, the Texas long-arm statute, became effective in 1959, but
the Texas Supreme Court did not construe the statute until 1977.29 In a
number of decisions, however, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the statute
without guidance from the Texas Supreme Court. In Atwood Hatcheries v.
Heisdorf& Nelson Farms,30 decided in 1966, the Fifth Circuit addressed
the question of whether a foreign corporation that contracted with several
22. Id at 97-98 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977)).
23. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
24. Id at 292 (citing McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).
25. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). The Court held a Texas insurance company amenable to suit
in a California court to recover the proceeds of an insurance policy. Id at 224. The Court
found that due process was not offended because the suit was based on a contract accepted
in California. Id at 223.
26. Id at 223-24. In this context the Court cited Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman,
294 U.S. 623 (1935) (state interest in corporate securities demonstrated by regulation
thereof), and Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (state interest in adjudicating automobile
accidents between its citizens and nonresidents manifested by special long-arm statute pro-
viding for exercise of personal jurisdiction over such nonresident motorists).
27. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 849 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
28. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
29. The Texas Supreme Court first construed art. 203 1b in U-Anchor Advertising, Inc.
v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978). See infra notes 56-61
and accompanying text. The delay was due in part to the effect of York v. State, 73 Tex. 65 1,
II S.W. 869 (1889), afl-d, 137 U.S. 15 (1890). Under the York rule the defendant either
appeared generally, thereby waiving the right to challenge jurisdiction, or stayed out of the
state and allowed a default judgment to be taken. Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d
591, 599 n.10 (5th Cir. 1969) (quoting Thode, supra note 3, at 306). Adoption in 1962 of
TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a, which allows a defendant to appear specially to contest jurisdiction
without becoming subject to the jurisdiction of the court, partially obviated the York prob-
lem. See supra note 4.
30. 357 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1966).
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Texas hatcheries to lease or sell breeding chickens could be subject to the
jurisdiction of Texas. The appellate court asserted that two inquiries are
appropriate: whether state law provides for the exercise of jurisdiction
under the circumstances presented, and if so, whether the exercise of juris-
diction pursuant to state law violates the federal Constitution.31 In con-
cluding that jurisdiction was proper, the court declared that "'the Texas
purpose [in enacting article 203 lb] was to exploit to the maximum the ful-
lest permissible reach under federal constitutional restraints.' ",32
The Fifth Circuit addressed the reach of article 203 lb in a products lia-
bility action in Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Kiian.33 A young girl had been
seriously injured in a fall from an amusement ride manufactured by an
Oregon corporation. The court acknowledged that while the injury-pro-
ducing tort did not arise out of the defendant's contacts with the state,
jurisdiction over the defendant was proper based on the defendant's "con-
tinuous and substantial business relations directly with Texas concerns."' 34
The court found an additional justification in the fact that Eyerly Aircraft
had introduced the injury-producing product into interstate commerce and
had reason to know that it would eventually end up in Texas.35
The Fifth Circuit's struggle with article 203 1b was typified in Jetco Elec-
tronic Industries Inc. v. Gardiner.36 The plaintiff brought a tort action as-
serting the defendant's negligence in conducting tests on treasure hunting
equipment and its libelous conduct in making the results available for sub-
sequent dissemination in Texas. The court first found that a defendant
who "does business" in Texas is amenable to jurisdiction in suits arising
from such business, including the commission of a tort in whole or in part
within the state.37 The court then noted that article 203 lb was intended to
reach the outer limits of in personam jurisdiction and held that jurisdiction
could be asserted if the defendant's unrelated contacts satisfied the mini-
mum contacts requirement. 38 In conclusion, the court ruled that even
though the defendant's contacts were neither as "substantial" nor "contin-
uous" as the defendant's contacts were in Eyery Aircraft, the assertion of
jurisdiction did not offend due process. 39
31. Id at 852.
32. Id. (quoting Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69, 72-73
(5th Cir. 1961)); see Thode, supra note 9, at 307. The Fifth Circuit had previously addressed
art. 203 1b in Turner v. Jack Tar Grand Bahama, Ltd., 353 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1965), and in
Lone Star. In both cases the court tentatively suggested that the Texas long-arm statute
reached to the permissible limits of due process, but did not expressly so hold. The court's
reluctance stemmed from the fact that the Texas Supreme Court had not yet construed the
statute. Turner, 353 F.2d at 956.
33. 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969).
34. Id. at 597.
35. Id.; see Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315, 1317-18 (5th Cir. 1970).
36. 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973).
37. Id at 1232.
38. Id at 1234 (citing Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d 847
(5th Cir. 1966)); accord Gurley v. Lindsley, 450 F.2d 268, 278 (5th Cir. 1972): Mitsubishi
Shoji Kaisha Ltd. v. MS Galini, 323 F. Supp. 79, 81 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Hearne v. Dow-
Badische Chem. Co., 224 F. Supp. 90, 98-99 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
39. 473 F.2d at 1234-35. Compare the seemingly conflicting statements in Jetco with
1983]
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While this somewhat confusing line of precedent was developing in the
federal courts, the Texas Supreme Court had occasion to consider indi-
rectly the question of long-arm jurisdiction. In O'Brien v. Lanpar Co. ,40 a
1966 decision, the Texas Supreme Court had to determine whether an Illi-
nois judgment against a defaulting Texas corporation was entitled to full
faith and credit in Texas. As posited by the court, the judgment's validity
turned on the court's construction of the Illinois long-arm statute,4' subject
to the limitations of due process. 42 The plaintiff was an Illinois attorney
seeking full payment for services he performed in Illinois for a Texas cor-
poration. Since Illinois courts had repeatedly held that the Illinois statute
extended as far as permitted by the due process clause, 43 the Texas court
turned to an examination of due process standards. After reviewing the
development of those standards in decisions by the United States Supreme
Court, the Texas court adopted a due process standard formulated by the
Washington Supreme Court," which set forth three factors for determin-
ing if jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation can be entertained. 45
First, the nonresident defendant must purposefully do some act in the fo-
rum state; second, the cause of action must arise from, or be connected
with, such act; third, the assertion of jurisdiction by the forum state must
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.46 Al-
though the Texas Supreme Court was careful to emphasize that it was the
Illinois law and not the Texas law that was under consideration, these
standards were quickly adopted as the test for amenability to jurisdiction
in Texas.47
The first of two important decisions by Texas courts directly analyzing
the two similarly conflicting tests for assessing jurisdiction recognized by the Texas Supreme
Court in U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1063 (1978), discussedinfra notes 56-61 and accompanying text. Just one year after
Jetco, in Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974), the Fifth Cir-
cuit returned to its more common assessment that article 203 1b reaches as far as constitu-
tional requirements of due process will permit, without reference to any nexus requirement.
Id at 491.
40. 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966).
41. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 16 & 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968 & Supp. 1982-1983).
42. 399 S.W.2d at 341.
43. Id
44. See Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245,
251 (1963).
45. 399 S.W.2d at 342. The Fifth Circuit later questioned the Texas Supreme Court's
use of the Tyee test in O'Brien as a due process standard. Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652
F.2d 1260, 1266 n.8 (5th Cir. 1981).
46. 399 S.W.2d at 342.
47. Id at 343. The context in which the O'Brien test appears indicates that it is a due
process test rather than one of statutory interpretation. The subsequent treatment of the test
by the Texas Supreme Court in U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762
(Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978), supports that position. In U-Anchor the court
expressly adopted the test as a due process standard. Id The second prong, however, which
requires the cause of action to arise from, or be connected with, the defendant's contacts in
the forum, is in conflict with the recognized federal standard for due process. See supra note
39 and accompanying text. See generally Comment, The Texas Long-Arm Statute, Article
2031b: A New Process is Due, 30 Sw. L.J. 747, 758-70 (1976).
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article 2031 b was Hoppenfeld v. Crook .48 The plaintiff brought a tort ac-
tion against a New York resident alleging fraudulent misrepresentation in
inducing him to enter into a franchise agreement with the defendant. As a
preliminary determination, the Austin court of civil appeals noted that the
burden of persuasion and proof is on the nonresident defendant contesting
jurisdiction pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a.49 The de-
fendant argued that it was not amenable to process under article 2031b
because its activities did not constitute "doing business" within the mean-
ing of the statute.50 The court rejected the defendant's argument because
"statutory construction" is not the proper inquiry; rather, the proper focus
is on due process standards, since the reach of article 2031b "is limited
only by the United States Constitution." 5' The court then applied the
O'Brien test to determine whether the requirements of due process had
been met. 52 The following year in Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Lumar5 3 a Texas
corporation brought suit against a Virginia resident alleging breach of a
franchise agreement. The Eastland court of civil appeals concluded that
the defendant was "doing business" in Texas and was, therefore, subject to
the state's long-arm statute.54 The court then applied the O'Brien test to
determine whether assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant was permis-
sible under due process. The court held the defendant amenable to
jurisdiction.55
48. 498 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ refd n.r.e.).
49. Id. at 55. The converse is true in federal court; the party invoking jurisdiction has
the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists. Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495
F.2d 483, 490 (5th Cir. 1974).
50. 498 S.W.2d at 55-56.
51. Id. at 56. The court believed this interpretation to be "well entrenched" in the fed-
eral courts, citing Gurley v. Lindsley, 459 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1972); Atwood Hatcheries v.
Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1966); Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner,
325 F. Supp. 80 (S.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973); AMCO Transworld,
Inc. v. M/V Bambi, 257 F. Supp. 215 (S.D. Tex. 1971). 498 S.W.2d at 56. The Hoppenfeld
court, however, was apparently unaware of the Fifth Circuit's rather confusing treatment of
art. 203 lb in Jetco, because it only cited the district court's disposition of the case. The Fifth
Circuit had handed down its decision on appeal just a few months before. See supra notes
36-39 and accompanying text.
52. 498 S.W.2d at 56-58.
53. 513 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ ret d n.r.e.).
54. Id. at 254.
55. Id at 254-55. The Fifth Circuit addressed these developments in Wilkerson v. For-
tuna Corp., 554 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1977). In Wilkerson a Texas horse trainer brought suit
against a corporation operating a horse track in New Mexico, just across the border from El
Paso, and alleged that he had been arbitrarily denied the use of horse stalls at the track. The
district court relied on O'Brien, Hoppenfeld, and Pizza Inn in dismissing the action, because
it found that the cause did not arise from any of the defendant's activities in Texas. Id at
747 & n.2. The Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that the defendant's "general endeavors"
in Texas constituted "doing business" within the meaning of art. 2031b. Id. at 749. The
court did not think it "appropriate" to require the plaintiff to demonstrate some specific
local act that created the cause of action. Id The court also concluded that due process did
not require a showing of a specific nexus between the defendant's activities in the forum and
the cause of action. Id at 749-50 (citing National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of
Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977)). The Fifth Circuit had also had the O'Brien test before it
in Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969). See supra notes 33-35 and
accompanying text. The defendant in Eyerly had argued that O'Brien undermined previous
Fifth Circuit interpretations of art. 2031b; the court disagreed, however, stating that in
19831 NOTES 1203
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The Texas Supreme Court interpreted article 2031 b for the first time in
1977 in U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt.56 The plaintiffs cause of action
arose from the breach of a rental contract executed by the parties in
Oklahoma that provided for the erection of six advertising signs in
Oklahoma. The contract required the defendant to mail payments to the
plaintiff's Amarillo office. The defendant argued that it was not "doing
business" in Texas, but the court, concluding that the mailing of payments
constituted "doing business," disagreed:
[I]n this respect, as well as with respect to "other acts that may consti-
tute doing business," Article 2031 b reaches as far as the federal consti-
tutional requirements of due process will permit. We let stand the
statement in [Hoppenfeld] "that the reach of Art. 2031 b is limited only
by the United States Constitution." . . . The federal courts have simi-
larly construed Article 2031b.... Furthermore, such a construction
is desirable in that it allows the courts to focus on the constitutional
limitations of due process rather than to engage in technical and ab-
struse attempts to consistently define "doing business.
5 7
Since the specific requirements of article 2031b were deemed satisfied,
the court turned to the due process question. The court acknowledged two
different tests for resolving that question: the dual test announced by the
Fifth Circuit in Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau58 and the tripartite
test articulated by the Texas Supreme Court in O'Brien. The distinction
between the two due process standards lies in the "arising from" require-
ment of the O'Brien test.59 The court neither stated a preference for either
test, nor acknowledged the potential conflict between the two. The court
did conclude, however, that the assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant
would violate due process. 60 The defendant was a customer of a Texas
corporation who "neither sought, initiated, nor profited from his single and
fortuitous contact with Texas." 6'
The U-Anchor opinion further confused the scope of article 203 lb. The
court broadly equated the reach of the statute with due process, without
discussion of the "arising from" language in the statute. Further, the
court's use of two separate tests in its due process discussion provides little
guidance as to the number of contacts it deems necessary for assertion of
jurisdiction.
This uncertainty manifested itself in subsequent lower court decisions.
O'Brien the Texas Supreme Court had been concerned with the Illinois long-arm statute
rather than its own. 414 F.2d at 599 n.12. Moreover, the Eyerly court said, O'Brien was
discussing due process limitations and not statutory limitations. Id
56. 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
57. 553 S.W.2d at 762 (citations omitted).
58. 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974). The Cousteau test requires "[flirst, 'there must be
some minimum contact with the state which results from an affirmative act of the defend-
ant.' Secondly, 'it must be fair and reasonable to require the defendant to come into the
state and defend the action.'" Id at 494 (quoting 2 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE's FED-
ERAL PRACTICE 4.25[5], at 4-262 (2d ed. 1982)).
59. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
60. 553 S.W.2d at 763.
61. Id
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In Michigan General Corp. v. Mod- U-Kraf Homes, Inc. ,62 a case arising out
of an alleged breach of contract, the Dallas court of appeals applied both
due process tests set forth in U-Anchor. Since the court found the nexus
requirement of O'Brien satisfied, it was able to avoid the conflict between
the two tests. 63 Another court was even less clear in its reading of U-
Anchor. In Computer Synergy Corp. v. Business Systems Products64 a
Houston court of appeals cited the O'Brien test as the proper standard for
assessing the reach of article 203 lb. At the same time, the court recognized
that the O'Brien test was a synthesis of United States Supreme Court deci-
sions assessing the scope of due process. 65 Another Houston court of ap-
peals noted the potential conflict between the two due process tests in
Siskind v. Villa Foundation for Education, Inc. 66 That court noted:
"[T]hough the Supreme Court of Texas has indicated the Texas Long-Arm
Statute is to reach as far as the Federal Constitutional requirements of due
process will permit [citing U-Anchor], the factors used in the federal courts
are less strict than those purportedly used in Texas."' 67 None of the courts
recognizing both tests were forced to reconcile the tests, however, since in
each case, the courts concluded that the cause of action had arisen from
the defendants' contacts in Texas.
The Fifth Circuit interpreted article 2031b in Preean v. Sonatrach,
Inc.68 In that case two engineering firm employees under contract with
the Algerian national oil company were killed in a plane crash in Algeria.
Their widows brought a wrongful death action against the oil company, an
Algerian airline, and an aircraft manufacturer. The district court dis-
missed the action against each defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction,
and the plaintiffs appealed. 69 The Fifth Circuit first examined the mean-
ing and application of the Texas long-arm statute, and correspondingly,
62. 582 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
63. Id. at 596. Other cases in which both the Cousteau and O'Brien tests were applied
include Siskind v. Villa Found. for Educ., Inc., 624 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1981), rev'd in part, af'd in part, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 78 (Nov. 3, 1982);
Sherman Gin Co. v. Planters Gin Co., 599 S.W.2d 348, 350-51 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (finding the O'Brien test not met and citing Cousteau in support
thereof); Motiograph, Inc. v. Check-Out Sys., 573 S.W.2d 606, 607-08 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1978, writ ref'd).
64. 582 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1979, no writ). For a factual
comparison of Computer Synergy, Mod-U-Kraf, and Motiograph, see Newton, Conflict of
Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 385, 390-92 (1980).
65. 582 S.W.2d at 575-76. Other cases relying primarily on the O'Brien test for assess-
ing amenability to jurisdiction include Read v. Cary, 615 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Wright Waterproofing Co. v. Applied Polymers, 602 S.W.2d
67, 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas), writ refd per curiam, 608 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1980);
Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Lummis, 596 S.W.2d 916, 921 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston (14th
Dist.] 1980, no writ); Quiroz v. McNamara, 585 S.W.2d 859, 861-62 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1979, no writ); Diversified Resources Corp. v. Geodynamics Oil & Gas, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 97,
98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
66. 624 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981), rev'd in part, afdin
part, 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 78 (Nov. 3, 1982); see infra note 123.
67. 624 S.W.2d at 807.
68. 652 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1981).
69. Id. at 1264.
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whether or not article 2031 b authorizes the broadest reach that fourteenth
amendment due process permits.70 The court found that the Texas statute6expressly limits its personal jurisdiction to causes of action arising out of
activities or business done within the state."' 71 The Fifth Circuit distin-
guished the language in U-Anchor that indicated that article 2031 b reaches
the constitutional limits of due process: "[The] language directly ad-
dressed only the meaning of 'doing business' in the context of whether it is
coextensive with the constitutional confines of due process. ' 72 The court
also noted that even a legislative intent that the statute in its entirety reach
constitutional bounds could not alter the unambiguous language of the
statute. 73 The Fifth Circuit concluded that it was confident that the Texas
Supreme Court would also require a nexus between the cause of action
and the defendant's contacts with Texas solely on the basis of the statute. 74
Several months later, in Placid Investments, Ltd v. Girard Trust Bank,75
the Fifth Circuit found the plaintiffs argument that its cause of action
need not arise out of specific Texas contacts "foreclosed by Prejean .,76
The plaintiff also argued that jurisdiction could be obtained under Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 108.7 7 The court responded that a rule of proce-
dure adopted by the Texas Supreme Court could not be used as an "end-
run" around the substantive jurisdictional requirements of article 203 1b,
as enacted by the Texas Legislature. 78 Similarly, in Jim Fox Enterprises,
Inc. v. Air France79 the Fifth Circuit reasserted that the Texas long-arm
statute requires a nexus between the cause of action and the defendants'
contacts with Texas.80 "This requirement means that Texas does not reach
70. Id The Fifth Circuit has consistently stated that the threshold question in assessing
whether jurisdiction is to be maintained is whether the state statutory requirements have
been met. Only after that question is affirmatively answered will the court turn to federal
due process considerations. Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d 847,
852 (5th Cir. 1966); see supra note 31 and accompanying text. But cf. Eyerly Aircraft Co. v.
Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969) (due process considerations addressed before state stat-
utory requirements).
71. 652 F.2d at 1265 (quoting thereafter from article 203 1b, §§ 2, 3); see supra note 9.
72. 652 F.2d at 1265-66. The court also distinguished Cousteau, Jetco, Eyerly Aircraft,
and Atwood Hatcheries on the ground that those cases proclaimed maximum statutory reach
only in the context of what were sufficient contacts, but not with respect to whether article
203 1b required a nexus. Id at 1266 n.7.
73. Id at 1266 n.7. The court noted that there was no legislative history on the intended
scope of the statute. Id
74. Id at 1266 n.8.
75. 662 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1981), withdrawn and vacated on rehearing, No. 81-1273, slip
op. (5th Cir. Oct. 28, 1982) (remanded for further proceedings consistent with Helicol); see
infra note 123.
76. 662 F.2d at 1178.
77. Id at 1179. TEX. R. Civ. P. 108 (Vernon 1979) provides that a "defendant served
with such notice shall be required to appear and answer. . . to the full extent that he may
be required to appear and answer under the Constitution of the United States in an action in
rem or in personam." The part of the quoted excerpt following the ellipsis was added by
amendment by the Texas Supreme Court in 1975. In U-Anchor the Texas Supreme Court
stated "that the purpose of the amendment is to permit acquisition of in personam jurisdic-
tion to the constitutional limits." 553 S.W.2d at 762 n. I.
78. 662 F.2d at 1179.
79. 664 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1981).
80. Id at 63-64.
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nearly as far as Due Process would permit."'' s The court therefore held
that it could not maintain jurisdiction over the defendant even though the
defendant had "'minimum contacts' galore."8
2
III. HALL v. HELICOPTEROS NACIONALES DE COLOMBIA, S.A.
In the original Hall v. Heico?83 opinion, the Texas Supreme Court, after
noting the confusion surrounding article 2031 b, reaffirmed its view that the
statute reaches as far as the constitutional limits of due process will per-
mit.8 4 The court refuted the narrow definition of "doing business" applied
by the court of appeals, which required a showing that the defendant
either committed a tort or entered into a contract to be performed in
Texas.85 Instead, the court noted that the catchall language in the defini-
tion of "doing business" in article 2031 b had been invoked to extend juris-
diction to due process limits.
86
The court further found in its original opinion that U-Anchor had
adopted the O'Brien test as the proper standard for determining due pro-
cess.87 In discussing the second prong of the O'Brien test, the "arising out
of' requirement, the court held that satisfaction of this prong was not a
prerequisite for the assertion of jurisdiction. 88 In the absence of such a
nexus, the court suggested that due process "compels proof of more perva-
sive contacts with the forum."' 89 Applying this standard to Helicol's con-
tacts with Texas, the court concluded the relationship was insufficient to
justify an assertion of jurisdiction. 90
Justice Wallace dissented from the majority's conclusion in the original
decision and cited eight specific acts committed by Helicol in Texas, in-
cluding the negotiation of the contract in Houston and the purchase of
four million dollars worth of equipment from Bell Helicopter, a Texas cor-
poration. 91 The dissent opined that these contacts satisfied all three prongs
81. Id at 64.
82. Id
83. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 190 (Feb. 24, 1982), withdrawn, 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982).
84. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 191. This interpretation is plainly at odds with the Fifth
Circuit's interpretation in Prejean. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
85. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 191. Although § 4 of art. 203 1b specifies several acts that
constitute "doing business," the section indicates that it does so "without including other
acts that may constitute doing business." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon
Supp. 1982-1983).
86. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 191.
87. Id at 192.
88. Id
89. Id Stated another way, the defendant's "general business presence" in Texas must
be established. This presence is characterized by "substantial, continuous, and systematic"
activities. Id at 193 (quoting Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445-48
(1952)).
90. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 194.
91. Id at 195 (Wallace, J., dissenting). Justices Spears and Ray joined in the dissent.
In particular, Justice Wallace found that the majority's reliance on World-Wide Volkswagen
v. Woodson was "unfounded" because he considered it distinguishable from Helicol on the
facts. Id at 195-96.
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of the O'Brien test.92 Justice Wallace stated that the "arising out of' re-
quirement was met because the insurance contract negotiated in Houston
named the deceased workers as third-party beneficiaries of the contract. 93
Thus, the dissent disagreed with the majority's application of the O'Brien
test to the facts.
On motion for rehearing the court withdrew its original opinion and
reversed itself.94 Justice Wallace delivered the substituted opinion for a
plurality of the court. The plurality opinion reaffirmed the court's position
set forth in the original opinion and in U-Anchor that article 2031 b reaches
as far as the constitutional requirements of due process will permit.95 The
plurality also reiterated the court's approval of the O'Brien test as the
proper due process standard. 96 Justice Wallace, however, gave an even
broader reading of the second prong than had the majority in the court's
original opinion. In its plurality opinion the court found that while the
nexus requirement was useful whenever a jurisdictional question existed, it
was only necessary when the defendant maintained a single or few con-
tacts with the forum.97 The court concluded that due process does not
require that the cause of action arise out of the defendant's contacts with
the forum when those contacts are "numerous. ' 98 The court found that
Helicol's contacts were sufficient, under this standard, to maintain jurisdic-
tion.99 In reaching this conclusion the court noted the following contacts:
Helicol negotiated the contract in Houston; Helicol purchased virtually all
its helicopters and helicopter equipment in Fort Worth; Helicol sent pilots
to Fort Worth to fly its newly purchased helicopters out of Texas; Helicol
trained its pilots and maintenance personnel in Texas; Helicol had em-
ployees in Texas year-round; and Helicol both received and made pay-
ments through a Houston bank.'°°
Justice Campbell, joined by Justice McGee, wrote a concurring opin-
ion. 10 The concurring opinion focused on the parties involved and con-
cluded that the application of due process must be broader in scope when
the jurisdictional conflict is between citizens of different countries rather
than of different states. 102 Although the plaintiffs were not Texas resi-
dents, Justice Campbell argued that requiring the widows and children
who sought relief to prosecute their action in a foreign country was unrea-
92. Id. at 195-96. Justice Wallace concluded that "fair play and substantial justice" was
best served by providing a forum for the survivors of four workmen, hired in Texas by a
Texas citizen to fulfill a contract negotiated in Texas, against Helicol, which had a long
history of substantial contacts with Texas. Id at 196.
93. Id. at 195.
94. 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982).
95. Id. at 872. For the U-Anchor language quoted by Justice Wallace, see supra text
accompanying note 57.
96. 638 S.W.2d at 872.
97. Id.
98. Id
99. Id. at 874.
100. Id at 871-72.
101. Id. at 874-77. Both justices had joined in the majority opinion prior to rehearing.
102. Id at 875.
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sonable and that Texas therefore had an interest in adjudicating the dis-
pute. 10 3 He supported this conclusion by holding that Helicol's contacts
with Texas were numerous and purposefully conducted to benefit the com-
pany. 1°4 The concurrence concluded that due process would not be vio-
lated by subjecting Helicol to the jurisdiction of the Texas courts. 0 5
The dissent, written by Justice Pope,'°6 considered article 2031 b and the
Fifth Circuit cases construing the statute's scope and concluded that article
2031b does not reach as far as due process permits. 0 7 Justice Pope found
that while due process does not always require that the cause of action
arise from the defendant's contacts with the forum, the wording of the
Texas statute demands that such a nexus be shown. 08 As such, Justice
Pope stated that the statute expresses the legislative will and must be en-
forced by the courts. 0 9 The dissent also agreed with the Fifth Circuit's
determination in Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc. "10 that the U-Anchor language
construing the reach of article 2031 b"' was not inconsistent with the need
for showing a nexus." 2 Justice Pope sharply differed from the plurality on
his reading of the facts and charged that the other justices had relied on
incorrect findings in recognizing jurisdiction." 3 He concluded that be-
cause Helicol was not "doing business" in Texas, and because the plain-
tiff's cause of action did not arise from Helicol's contacts in Texas, the
statutory requirements for assertion of jurisdiction had not been met." 4
Justice Pope also argued, as he had in the court's original opinion, that
even if the requirements of article 2031 b had been met, due process pre-
103. Id In the plurality opinion Justice Wallace also had argued that Texas had an inter-
est in the litigation because it involved employees of a Texas resident, particularly in light of
the "countless" number of international companies headquartered in Texas. Id at 873.
104. Id. at 875.
105. Id. at 876. Several factors indicate that Justices Campbell and McGee would agree
that art. 2031b reaches as far as due process permits. Both joined in the court's original
majority opinion, which so held, and both concurred without objection in Justice Wallace's
plurality opinion, which also so held. Perhaps just as significantly, both declined to join in
the restrictive treatment given the statute by Justice Pope in his dissent. The fact that Justice
Campbell turned immediately to due process considerations in his concurring opinion is also
consistent with this view. Whether Justices Campbell and McGee agree, however, with the
expansive treatment given the nexus requirement by Justice Wallace is unclear. Given their
joinder in the court's original majority opinion and their concurrence with Justice Wallace,
Justices Campbell and McGee would probably agree that a nexus is not a rigid due process
requirement. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. Justice Campbell found that
Helicol had a "continuous general presence in Texas." Id at 875. He also found that
Helicol had "substantial contacts" in Texas and had "purposefully conducted activities
within the state." Id at 875, 877. The fact that Justice Campbell felt obliged to make such
findings indicates support for the more limited construction given the nexus requirement by
Justice Pope in the original majority opinion. See infra note 123.
106. Chief Justice Greenhill and Justice Barrow joined in the dissent.
107. 638 S.W.2d at 877.
108. Id. at 879.
109. Id at 880.
110. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
1!1. See supra text accompanying note 57.
112. 638 S.W.2d at 881; see supra note 72 and accompanying text,
113, 638 S.W.2d at 877.
114. Id. at 881.
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cluded assertion of jurisdiction over Helicol."15 In this context Justice
Pope reasserted his view that absent a showing of a nexus between the
cause of action and the defendant's contact, jurisdiction could not be as-
serted unless the defendant had engaged in "substantial and continuous
activity in the forum." ' 16 He argued that the plurality had therefore been
mistaken in applying the minimum contacts standard. 17 Justice Pope
concluded that Helicol's activities did not satisfy that standard and warned
that the plurality's expansive reading of the Texas long-arm statute estab-
lished Texas as a "magnet" forum, attracting lawsuits against any defend-
ant who has ever done business in Texas. 118
The two most significant aspects of Heicol are Justice Wallace's conclu-
sion that article 203 1 b reaches as far as due process will permit, and the
expansive treatment he gives the "arising under" requirement of the
O'Brien test. The practical impact of these points is, however, somewhat
problematic since Justice Wallace was writing for only a plurality of the
Texas Supreme Court. Nevertheless, several factors indicate that Justices
Campbell and McGee support the view that article 203 1 b is coextensive
with due process standards. 19 Similarly, the alignment of Justices Camp-
bell and McGee with the majority in the original opinion, and their con-
currence with Justice Wallace's substituted opinion, indicates that neither
would require a nexus between the cause of action and the defendant's
contacts with the forum, at least when the defendant has engaged in nu-
merous and purposeful activities within the state. 120
Whether the Fifth Circuit will retreat from the restrictive reading it gave
article 2031 b in Prejean '21 is also problematic and depends on the reading
that it gives to Justice Campbell's concurrence. In view of the fact that
only three justices explicitly adopted the Pre'ean interpretation, the Fifth
Circuit may adopt Justice Wallace's view-that article 203 lb reaches to the
constitutional limits of due process. The Texas Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of federal due process is not, however, binding on the Fifth
Circuit. 122
115. Id at 882-83.
116. Id at 883; see supra note 89 and accompanying text; cf. supra note 92 (Justice Wal-
lace, originally dissenting, concluded that the facts supported a finding of jurisdiction); supra
note 105 (Justice Campbell, concurring in the substituted opinion, found sufficient contacts
to justify assertion of jurisdiction).
117. 638 S.W.2d at 883.
118. Id Justice Pope also rejected the notion that a broader due process standard is to be
applied when the defendant is a resident of a foreign nation rather than of another state. Id
119. See supra note 105.
120. Id
121. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text; infra note 123 for Fifth Circuit treat-
ment of article 2031 b subsequent to Heicol and the writing of this Note.
122. In Southwest Offset, Inc. v. Hudco Publishing Co., 622 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1980), the
district court had concluded that jurisdiction was lacking over the defendant based on the
Texas Supreme Court's language in U-Anchor. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, stating that it
was not bound by the Texas court's holding on lack of minimum contacts. "This is so be-
cause the Texas Supreme Court's holding in U-Anchor was predicated on the due process
clause of the United States Constitution, and the federal courts are not bound by state court
determinations of what the Constitution requires." Id at 152 (footnote omitted).
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The other noteworthy aspect of Helicol is the willingness of Justices
Wallace and Campbell to apply a broader due process standard with re-
spect to non-American defendants. Whether or not this willingness will
establish Texas as a "magnet" forum, as Justice Pope suggests, remains to
be seen. It does suggest, however, increased prospects for obtaining juris-
diction over a foreign corporation doing business in Texas. 123
IV. CONCLUSION
In Hall v. Helicol a plurality of the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed the
court's view that the Texas long-arm statute reaches as far as the constitu-
tional limits of due process will permit. Support for that position is im-
plicit in the position of two concurring justices. The court also attempted
to clarify the interpretation Texas courts are to give the O'Brien test. The
plurality's construction almost obviates the need to show a nexus between
the cause of action sued upon and the defendant's contacts in Texas.
While the concurring justices may not support the broad reading of the
plurality, they seem at least to have dispensed with the nexus requirement
when the defendant has engaged in numerous and purposeful activities
with the state. The Texas Supreme Court also exhibited a willingness to
subject residents of foreign nations, particularly foreign corporations, to
the jurisdiction of Texas courts. Since numerous international concerns
conduct business in Texas, such a willingness may have a significant
impact.
Thomas P. Arnold
123. In this context, note two developments concerning art. 2031b since the second
Helicol decision. The first is the Texas Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Siskind v.
Villa Found. for Educ., Inc., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 78 (Nov. 3, 1982). In Siskind the plaintiffs
brought suit against an Arizona corporation, which operates a school for problem students
in Arizona, and against individual employees of the corporation. Numerous causes of ac-
tion were asserted, including breach of contract, misrepresentation, and deceptive trade
practices. Justice McGee, writing for the court, held that in the case of a defendant's having
only a single or few contacts with Texas, the court would apply the three-pronged O'Brien
test. Id at 79. Applying that standard, the court concluded that jurisdiction was appropri-
ate as to the corporation since the cause of action arose out of misrepresentations both made
and relied on in Texas, but was inappropriate as to the individual defendants. Id. at 80-81.
The court noted that because the nexus requirement was satisfied the case did not involve an
art. 203 lb question, but was limited to the constitutional question of minimum contacts. id.
at 79. For that reason, the court made no mention of Helicol, although the two opinions are
largely consistent.
The second development is at the federal level. Several weeks after the second opinion in
Helicol became final, the Fifth Circuit granted rehearing in Placid Invs. Ltd. v. Girard Trust
Bank, 662 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1981), withdrawn and vacated on rehearing, No. 81-1273, slip
op. (5th Cir. Oct. 28, 1982). After noting the salient aspects of Helicol, including the Texas
court's judgment that art. 203 lb reaches to the limits of due process, the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that there could "be no doubt that [its] earlier views no longer [accorded] with Texas
authority." No. 81-1273, slip op. at 3. The court therefore vacated the district court's order
of dismissal, withdrew its original opinion, and remanded for further proceedings consistent
with Helicol. Id
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